Abstract. Two closely-related pseudo-random sequence generators are presented: The lIP generator, with input P a prime, outputs the quotient digits obtained on dividing by P. The x mod N generator with inputs N, Xo (where N P. Q is a product of distinct primes, each congruent to 3 mod 4, and x 0 is a quadratic residue mod N), outputs bob1 b2" where bi parity (xi) and xi+ x mod N.
Turing machine can, roughly speaking, do no better in guessing in polynomial time (polynomial in the length of the "seed," cf. 2) what the missing element is than by flipping a fair coin.
1. Two pseudo-random sequence generators. In this paper, two pseudo-random sequence generators are defined and their properties discussed. These are called"
(1) the 1 /P generator, (2) the x 2 mod N generator. The two generators are closely related. For example: From short seeds, each quickly generates long well-distributed sequences. Both generators contain hard problems at their core (the discrete logarithm problem and the quadratic residuacity problem, respectively). But only the second is "unpredictable"--assuming a certain intractibility hypothesis.
More specifically, TIEOREM 2, Problem 4 ( 6). Arty sequertce produced by the 1/ P generator is completely predictable; that is, given a small segment of the sequertce, orte cart quickly infer the "seed" and efficierttly extend the givert segment backwards artd forwards.
On the other hand, TIaEOREM 4 ( 7). Modulo the quadratic residuacity assumption, the x2mod N generator is polynomial-time unpredictable to the left. We say, for reasons pointed out irt the applications ( 10) , that the sequences it gerterates are cryptographically secure.
The 1/P generator has been well studied in the history of number theory [Dickson] and as a pseudo-random number generator [Knuth] . Our results concerning its strong inference properties, we believe, are new and surprising. The x 2 mod N generator is an outgrowth of the coin-flipping protocol of [Blum] . Its strong security properties derive from complexity based number theoretic assumptions and arguments [Blum] , [Goldwasser-Micali] , [Yao] . Our investigation reveals additional useful properties of this generator: e.g., from knowledge of the (secret) factorization of N, one can generate the sequence backwards; from additional information about N, one can even random access the sequence. Our number-theoretic analyses also provide tools for determining the lengths of periods of the generated sequences.
Both generators have applications. The lIP generator has applications to the generation of generalized de Bruijn (i.e., maximum-length shift-register) sequences. The x 2 mod ?4 generator has applications to public-key cryptography. The two generators are presented together so that each one's properties help to illuminate the other's.
2. Notation and definitions. In this paper, the underlying models of computation are Turing machines [Hopcroft and Ullman]. Probabilistic procedures are effective procedures (Turing machines) that can toss a fair coin (at a cost of 1 step per toss) to produce truly random bits during their computation. (Probabilistic) polynomial-time procedures halt in (worst-case) time poly(n), where poly denotes a polynomial, and n is the input length.
The base, b, will always be an integer > 1. For any positive integer, N, let
INl- [ We can, and sometimes do, think of Xv as a subset of X by identifying seed x Xv with "seed" (N, x)e X. With this identification, X can be thought of as the disjoint union (-Jr Xv. The point of view should be clear from context. DEFINITION. Let X" ={ (N, x) [N N, [NI n, and x XN} be the set of seeds of length n. Suppose for all sufficiently large integers n,/z is a probability distribution on X :'. Fnen U ={/x} is an accessible probability distribution on X if there is a polynomial poly and a probabilistic poly(n)-time procedure that for each sufficiently large input, n, outputs an element of X according to/z, with negligible error, i.e., it outputs an element of a set containing X according to a probability distribution on the set containing X) where, for all t, for all sufficiently large n, E(,x)x ItEm(N, x)-tz',,(N, x)[ < 1/n'.
A pair (X, U), where X is a seed domain and U is an accessible probability distribution on X, is called a seed space. We simply let X denote the seed space when the underlying distribution is clear. of length n , is output in time O(nt). (Thus, from short "seeds" (i.e., of "length" n), that are produced using at most poly(n) truly random bits, G generates long sequences (i.e., of length n), in polynomial time.) G(N, x) is called the pseudo-random sequence generated by G with input or seed (N, x).
Remark. If X represents a set of "observable states" for elements of seed space X, then the sequence G(N, x) might represent the observed states through which seed x p';:es (at times 0, 1, 2,...) resulting from some underlying transformation of X into itself. This point of view motivates the following more structured (and rrre restrictive) formulation of a pseudo-random sequence generator. DEFINITION. A transformation T on seed space X is a poly-time effective map T: X X such that for all sufficiently large n, T(X) X and T preserves/x, (i.e., /x, (A) =/x (T-1 (A)) for each A X). Let 0 < 8 < 1 be a fixed constant, and let be a fixed positive integer. Let poly be a fixed polynomial. Then for all sufficiently large n, for all but 8-fraction of n-bit primes P, for all primitive roots b mod P, Probability {(expected) time to compute P[b, P, y]=> poly (n)ly is selected uniformly from Ze*,} > 1In t.
2. The quadratic residuacity problem [Gauss] . Let N be a product of two distinct odd primes. Exactly half the elements of Z* have Jacobi symbol +1, the other half have Jacobi symbol -1. Denote the former by Z*(+I) and the latter by Z*(-1). None of the elements of Z*(-1) and exactly half the elements of Z*(+ 1) are quadratic residues. The quadratic residuacity problem with parameters N and x consists in deciding, for x in Z*(+ 1), whether or not x is a quadratic residue.
The quadratic residuacity assumption (QRA) . (This asserts that any efficient procedure for guessing quadratic residuacity will be incorrect for a fraction of the inputs.) Let poly (.) be a polynomial. Let P[N, x] be any (probabilistic) poly-time Downloaded 04/02/13 to 165.91.100.54. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php procedure which, on inputs N, x, each of length n, outputs 0 or 1. Let 0 < 6 < 1 be a fixed constant, and let be a positive integer. Then for n sufficiently large and for all but 6 fraction of numbers N of length n, N a product of two distinct equal length odd primes, the probability that PIN, x] is incorrect in guessing quadratic residuacity (i.e., PIN, x] 0 if x Z*(+ 1) is a quadratic residue mod N; 1 if not), given that x is chosen uniformly from Z'u(+ 1) and given the sequence of coin flips (in the case the procedure is probabilistic), exceeds 1/n in the sense that *+l Prob (PIN, x] is incorrect) > 1/n'. o(N)/2 By Lemma 3, the "l/n TM is replaceable by "(1/2)-(1/n')."
6. The lIP generator is predictable. Let P and b be relatively prime integers > 1 and r0 an integer in the range 0 < r0 < P. Denote the expansion of ro/P to base b by (1) ro/P .qlq2q3"
where 0 <_-qi < b. Since b is prime to P, the expansion is periodic. Then, for m >_-0, is less than or equal to the length of P: Irmlb <-IPI, where in this section ]PI denotes IPIb. Recall for roe Z'v, (1) defines the pseudo-random sequence generated by the 1/P generator with input ro/P.
There are several reasons one might consider the 1/P generator a good pseudorandom sequence generator: if the parameter P is a prime, and b is a primitive root mod P, the sequences produced have long periods and nice distribution properties (Theorem 1 below)l. In addition, these sequences possess certain hard-to-infer properties. For example, given a remainder r generated during the expansion of 1/P base b, it is hard, in general, to find any index m such that r,, r. This is because r,, bm mod P, so m is the discrete logarithm of r mod P. It follows (Theorem 2, problem 1) that, given a string of quotient digits q,,+qm+2" qm+k (k poly (IPI)), it is hard in general to find its locatioh in the sequence.
We remark that it would be natural to restrict the 1/P generator (base b) to the seed space Y {(P, r)lP is an odd prime, b is a primitive root mod P, Ze*} with the product distribution: for each (P, r) yn, let tzn(P, r) u,,(P) ve(r), where u is the uniform distribution on the parameters of length n and ve is uniform on Z*p. Then, on reasonable conjecture, {,},,z is accessible on Y since: a) E. Artin's conjecture and the prime number theorem imply that if b is not a square, then the cardinality of {PIP is a prime of length n and b is a primitive root modP} is more than (1/3). (2"/n), asymptotically as n goes to infinity [Shanks p. 81] . And, there are (Monte-Carlo) probabilistic polynomial-time procedures for b) testing primality [Strassen-Solovay]; c) testing if b is a primitive root mod P, given P and the factorization of P-[LeVeque, Thm. 4.8]; d) producing, for any k, k bit integers in factored form according to the uniform probability distribution [Bach] ; and e) computing greatest common divisors.
On the other hand, Theorem 2 will give a sense, which is correct, that the lIP generator yields a poor pseudo-random sequence: from knowledge of P and any IPl-long segment of the expansion of ro!P base b, one can efficiently extend the segment backwards and forwards (problem 2). More surprisingly (problem 4), from knowledge of any 21PI + 1 successive elements of the sequence, but not P, one can efficiently reconstruct P, and hence efficiently continue the sequence in either direction.
It follows that there is a simple efficient statistical test for deciding whether a 3n-long string of digits has either been generated by the expansion of lIP base b, for some prime P of length n, or has been generated at random (uniform probability distribution), given that it was produced in one of those two ways. Use 2n + 1 of the given 3n digits to recover the suspected P; use this P to generate 3n digits; then compare the generated digits with the 3n given digits: if they agree, the string has probably (with probability >=1-1/2"-1) been generated using the lIP generator.
To lead up to Theorem 1, we consider the following types of sequences (closely related to maximum-length shift register sequences [Golomb] Proof. Since r, b"'ro mod P and b is a primitive root mod P, the sequence of remainders r,, (generated during the expansion o 1/P base b) is periodic with period P-1, the remainders in any period are distinct, and {r,,ll <--m <_-P-1} {1,2,..., P-1}.
Similarly, the sequence of quotients r,,,/P is periodic with period P-1, the quotients in any period are distinct, and (5) {r,lPI1 <= m <-P-1}= {lIP, 2/P,..., (P-1)/P}.
Therefore, the sequence of quotient digits qm is periodic with period at most P-1. If the period were less than P-1, then there would be integers 0-< m < m2 < P-1 such that .q-,l/1q,-l/2
.qm/lq,-2/Z" "" Since rm/P=.q,,/lq,,/2 we would have r,l/P r,u/P, a contradiction. Therefore the period is P-1. [Gauss] Now is the inverse of b mod P. We note that (6) (bkr,n)/P=qm+l q,,+k + r,,+/P. So, q,.., qm+k [(bk+lrm-1)/PJ (By convention, we do not drop initial digits in a concatenation of quotient digits, e.g., in (6).)
To solve problem 2: By (6), r,,=(q,+l" "q,,+lpl)'P/blPl+(r,n+lpi)/bIPI. Since rm+lPI < P < blPI, rm [(qm+l qm+lel) P blPI]
In problems 3 and 4, the number P is not available and must be constructed.
To solve problem 3" By (6) with k 1, b. r, r,,/l q,,/l P where 0 =< q,,/l < b. Actually, 0 < q,+l, since, by assumption, b. r,,, # rm/l. Therefore, P equals some integer in the sequence of real numbers (b.r,,-r,,/l)/1, (b. rm-r,,/l)/2,'",(b'r,,-r,,/l)/b-1. Select any integer P in the sequence such that P is relatively prime to 1, 2,..., b. Such an integer P is unique; for suppose to the contrary that P, O are two such integers relatively prime to each of 1, 2,. , b. Then P. (i) O" (j) for some 0 < i, < b. Without loss of generality, suppose P < O. O is relatively prime to each of 1, 2,..., b, so gcd (O, i)= 1, so OIP, so O -< P, which is a contradiction.
The solution to problem 4, which is very pretty, is by continued fractions: By (6), r,,/P=q,,+l"'" q,,+/b+e where O<=e<l/b . By [LeVeque, p. 237, Thm. 9.10], the continued fraction expansion of q,,/l"'" q,,/k/b k has convergent r,,/P if l!bk= < 1/2P2, i.e., 2p2<=b k, i.e., logb (2p2)_-< k, as postulated. So r,/P=A/B for one of the convergents A1/B1, A2/B2," of the fraction q,n+l qm+k/bk. Since both b and ro are relatively prime to P, it follows (from (3)) that gcd (r,, P)-1, so r, A and P= Bi.
It remains to show that rm and P can be obtained by generating the above convergents until for some the first k digits of Ai/Bi are q,/l" q,/, at which point r,,,=Ai and P=B. To see why, recall that the continued fraction qm+l qm+k/bk 1/al + l/a2+ l/a3+" 1/ai+" has convergents A1/B1 1/al, AE/B2 a2/(ala2 + 1),. , A/B (aAi_l / A_2)/(aB-I + B-2), ". Here, the Bi are strictly increasing with i. Since for some i, Ai/Bi r,,/P, this procedure for obtaining r, and P will never go beyond A/B r,,/P. To see that the procedure generates convergents to the point where A/B=r,,/P, note that when Aj/Bj= q,,,+l"''qm+k''', the error is sufficiently small to ensure that A/B rm/P. Idea of proof. Here and in the sequel, we use polyl, poly2,'., to denote distinct polynomials. Suppose there were a probabilistic polyl-time test T that, for infinitely many n, has an advantage in distinguishing between the pseudo-random sequences of length poly (n) produced (from random seeds of length n) by the x mod N generator and truly random sequences of bits of the same polyl (n) length. Then for some positive integer and infinitely many n, the average value that T assigns to the pseudo-random sequences of length polyl (n) (generated from seeds of length n) lies outside, say above, apoy. + 1/n , whereas the average value it assigns (truly) random sequences lies inside Opolyl(n) q" 1In t+l. For each of these n, we can find integers j, k _->0, j+ k polyl (n) (in probabilistic poly2 (n)-time) such that "with high probability" the average value that T assigns to sequences in A {rl" r)+b b} is closer to Opoly(n) by at least 1/(nt+l.poly (n)) than the average higher value it assigns to sequences in B ={rl...rbob... b}where the bo"" b are sequences produced by the generator, the seed Xo having been chosen uniformly at random, and the rl"'" r+l are sequences of independent random bits. Integers j, k are found by trying different values of j, k, in each case sampling elements of the associated sets A, B, and applying T to these samples. The Weak Law of Large Numbers assures that this can be done in probabilistic poly2(n)-time.
We can convert T into a predictor for the generator: Given a sequence b b
produced by the generator, we submit a sample of poly3 (n)-many sequences of the form rl'"r1Ob", bk (where the rl,"" ", r are independently chosen random bits)
to test T and estimate the average value, call it a, assigned by T to the entire set of these sequences. Then submit the corresponding sequences rl ri I b bk to T and estimate the associated a 1. T's "advantage" in distinguishing between pseudo-random and random sequences can now be converted into an advantage in predicting bo correctly: Use a biased coin to predict bo. Set the bias so that the coin has probability (It is tempting but incorrect to suggest that we predict b0 0 if a is greater than a 1, else bo 1. Problems arise if for a few choices of bl ", the random strings rl'"rb'." bk give a correct strong bias toward bo=0, whereas for most choices of b..., the strings rl'"rb'l'" b'k give a weak bias toward b 1. One would end up giving wrong answers for the majority of strings b b,. In this case, the expectation of predicting bo correctly would be less than 1/2. The biased coin makes the expectation greater than 1/2.) QED Remark. We can construct another unpredictable generator as follows: recall that since N--1 mod 4, both x and -x (in Z*) have the same Jacobi symbol, and since N is odd, x and -x have opposite parity. Therefore, the parity property partitions Z*(+ 1) in half. In a similar fashion, the location property, where location (x)=0 if x < (N-1)/2, 1 if x-> (N-1)/2, partitions Z*(+I) in half. Exactly one of x and -x is a quadratic residue; but which of the two is the quadratic residue is hard to decide. Thus we get the following.
THEOREM. The modified x 2 mod N generator, gotten by extracting the location bit at each stage (instead of parity) is cryptographically secure (modulo the quadratic residuacity assumption).
Conjecture. The modified x 2 mod N generator, gotten by extracting two bits at each stage, parity (x) and location (x), is cryptographically secure.
Question. Parity (x) is the least significant bit of x; we can think of location (x), in a sense, as the most significant bit. How many bits (and which ones) can Proof. Let order x denote the order of x mod N. Then for x e Z*(+ 1), order x is odd, because:
(1) order x order xi+l. This is because (i) order xi/llordv x, and
(ii) Xo, xl," cycles.
(2) for all positive integers u, 2"llordvx=:>2"-llordvx+. Remark. It is reasonable to expect [Shanks] that the fraction of n-bit numbers that are special primes is asymptotically 1/((ln P)(ln Pa)(ln Pz)), which is asymptotically 1/(n31n3 2) since 2"<P<2"+a, 2"-a<Pa <2", and 2n-z<Pz<2n-a. It follows that there is an efficient, i.e., polynomial (n), probabilistic algorithm to find special n-bit primes: simply generate n bit numbers at random and use a probabilistic primality test [Strassen-Solovay] , [Miller] , [Rabin '80] to select the ones that are special. Assume to the contrary that ordx(r)/2 2 # 2P2Q2. Then either ordx<N)/2 (2) P2Q2 or ordx<N)/2 (2)12P2 or ordx<N)/2 (2)12Q2. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ordx<u)/E212P2 or ordx<N)/2 (2)= P202.
Roughly three fourths of all special numbers of the prescribed form satisfy this additional condition (that 2 is a quadratic residue with respect to at most one of Px and Oa). The condition is needed: for example, the special number in prescribed form, N 719.47, fails this condition (for this N, orda(N)/2 (2) X (X(N))/2 (2) the ith element x.
These will be useful in the cryptographic applications. Proof Let r=r(Xo).
Recall that (1) xi=(Xo)2modN and x,=(Xo)Z=modN=xo. Proof [Miller] has shown how to efficiently factor N-P. Q Proof. Assume to the contrary that the probabilistic poly-time procedure P has an e-advantage in guessing a pair. This P can be used to obtain a probabilistic poly-time procedure that has an e/poly (INI)-advantage in deciding quadratic residuosity of a randomly-chosen x Z*(+ 1)" Select l, 1 <-=< poly (INI), at random with the uniform mod N generator were a random access memory that is storing a pseudo-random sequence. [Brassard] has suggested applications, e.g., to the construction of unforgeable subway tokens, where this jumping ahead is desirable. (2.4) One often uses pseudo-random sequences (rather than random sequences) because they are reproducible [von Neumann]. For the pseudo-random sequences produced by the x 2 mod N generator, one has only to store a short seed in order to reproduce a long sequence; one does not have to store the entire random sequence.
M. O. Rabin [Rabin '79] introduced for his signature scheme the many-one trapdoor x 2 mod N (where N P. Q for distinct odd primes P, Q), which he proves is as hard to invert as factoring.
M. Blum [Blum] for his coin-flipping algorithm first chose P= Q-= 3 mod 4 to construct a trapdoor (the 3 mod 4 trapdoor) x 2 mod N (as hard to invert as factoring) which is 1-1 on the quadratic residues mod N.
S. Goldwasser and S. Micali [Goldwasser-Micali] use these properties (of the x 2 mod N trapdoor and the 3 mod 4 trapdoor) and the quadratic residuacity assumption which they first propose, to construct a protocol for mental poker and an encryption scheme that hides partial information. This directly addresses the problem pointed out by R. Lipton [Lipton] that partial information can be preserved and transmitted by trapdoor functions (e.g. the set of quadratic residues is invariant under the RSA function) giving rise to an advantage, and enabling trapdoors to be inverted on certain message spaces.
A. Shamir [Shamir] proposed the first example (based on RSA) o a cryptographically strong (i.e. polynomial-time unpredictable) pseudo-random sequence generator.
M. Blum and S. Micali [Blum-Micali] present general conditions on predicates that will ensure a cryptographically strong generator. Using these conditions and the Discrete Logarithm Conjecture they construct cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits.
A. Yao [Yao] , in his foundational paper on complexity based information theory, constructs a "perfect" pseudo-random sequence generator on the very general assumption that there exists a so-called "stable" one-way function.
Our x 2 mod N generator is based directly on a 3 mod 4 trapdoor and the QRA.
We believe that the 3 mod 4 scenario, because o its nice mathematical properties (e.g.
Lemma 1) will continue to lead to fruitful applications. We also believe that an in-depth analysis of sequences produced by unpredictable pseudo-random sequence generators, as begun in this paper, will provide useful information concerning the nature of these generators, and lead to insights about the number theoretic assumptions that have been made.
